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Abstract
This article offers an empirical answer to the question of which institutional
arrangements can help to keep the accounts of sub-national governments in bal-
ance. I take into consideration the autonomy that these governments have in
raising their revenues and fiscal rules as formulated in law or constitutions. The
former works as an implicit constraint since governments with more autonomy
might assume higher responsibility for accumulated deficits. The latter works as
a direct explicit constraint on sub-national borrowing, but might be subject to
endogeneity through preferences for fiscal responsibility. This potential source
of bias is taken into account by using IV techniques for fiscal rules. Results from
my original dataset, covering full information for 14 years of all EU15 countries,
show that the effectiveness of tools depends critically on the federal background.
Fiscal rules work in unitary countries, while higher tax autonomy yields lower
deficits in federations.
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1. Introduction
This paper tackles the questions of why the aggregated fiscal performance of sub-national
governments in European countries differs, and how this can be explained by different in-
stitutional settings, such as fiscal rules and autonomy over tax instruments.
Much research has been done since the early 1990’s which dealt with the question of why
certain countries have experienced long periods of budget deficits that accumulated in high
levels of public debt while others did not. Attention has focused on political and institu-
tional factors, since even countries with similar underlying economic conditions showed a
widespread variation in debt levels. It has been argued that to a large extent the design of
the institutions which govern the budgetary process is the underlying reason for the cross-
country heterogeneity in fiscal positions (among others, see von Hagen and Harden, 1994,
1995; von Hagen, 2002, 2005; Alesina and Perotti, 1996, for this line of argument).
While much attention, both theoretical and empirical, has been spent on the central or
general budget and national fiscal policy, the links between sub-national debts and deficits,
their institutions, and in particular the restrictions imposed on them by fiscal rules, have
not yet been explored in depth. The institutional background in this context is different
from that of the central level because vertical relationships between the levels of government
play a crucial role. This paper aims at a closer empirical investigation of the underlying
forces.
The differences in fiscal positions below the national level can be caused by a deficit bias
due to a common pool externality. Budgetary inflows in almost all countries come to a certain
extent from a common source in the form of transfers or grants, while budgetary outflows are
targeted to specific regions or municipalities. To be precise, a substantial share of revenues
is generated with instruments that sub-national entities have no direct discretion over. The
concept that the tax base is responsible for bailouts and connected through this channel to
the deficit bias was introduced by von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). They argue that, in
a dynamic context, the budget constraints of governments which are highly dependent on
revenues that are not generated by their own instruments might become soft. The respective
decision makers at the sub-national level might expect ex-ante that, if they cause a large and
unsustainable deficit, the resulting outstanding debt would have to be bailed out ex-post by
a higher-level government. In other words, the central government cannot credibly commit
itself to a no-bailout policy, if the respective lower level government has no power to solve
fiscal problems on its own because the instruments to do so are not available once fiscal
trouble has emerged. If instead a large proportion of sub-national revenues comes from own
tax resources, this might work as an implicit way of the central government to communicate
that sub-national entities should act on their own behalf. In this case, they can be asked
to implement adjustments by increasing tax rates under their control. Low fiscal autonomy
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instead is connected with higher deficits, since budget constraints are soft (von Hagen and
Eichengreen, 1996).
A recent attempt to mitigate this time inconsistency problem of soft budget constraints
was to impose fiscal rules on sub-national governments. The idea of fiscal rules is to force
local or regional governments to act in the way the central level desires. The number of
fiscal frameworks which impose balanced budget or debt rules on lower governmental sectors
has increased over the last two decades. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact could be seen as the cornerstone in the interest of such rules.
In recent years a strong increase in the number of fiscal rules at the national level can be
observed. The goal of these rules, often called “national stability pact”, could easily be
jeopardized if the budgetary policies of sub-national governments do not act in concert.
Therefore, almost all of these national pacts impose restrictions on lower level governments
as well.
The driving forces behind sub-national deficits I explore in this paper are twofold. On
the one hand, I focus on the autonomy that these governments have in raising revenues.
This autonomy might constrain sub-national sectors as a form of an implicit rule, since
greater autonomy goes along with greater responsibility for results of their fiscal policy. On
the other hand, I also focus on explicit fiscal rules, as formulated in laws or constitutions,
covering restrictions imposed on the sub-national sector to harden the budget constraint.
I also analyze what drives countries to adopt, keep, or to strengthen their framework of
rules. This is an important task that helps overcome a potential problem of endogeneity,
which is well known in this strand of literature. Stricter rules may be adopted by govern-
ments with stronger preferences for fiscal discipline or a severe need for consolidation. I
show that good instrumental variables for sub-national rules exist which can help to solve
this potential endogeneity problem. The main reasoning of the paper in this dimension is
that political characteristics of the rule imposing level might be good instruments for the
rules themselves at the lower governmental level. They fulfill the exclusion restriction since
these political variables might have an impact on the fiscal outcome of the central level, but
not on the deficits of sub-national governments.
I derive my results from a panel-data set of the sub-national sectors of the EU15 coun-
tries, covering data for fiscal rules, tax autonomy, and political and fiscal variables over the
period 1995-2008. Regressions of the deficits of sub-national sectors on measurements of the
strictness of rules and the discretion to tax show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and the
impact of tax autonomy depend critically on the federal structure of the respective country.
As a main result, fiscal rules work in unitary countries and not in federations, but implicit
restrictions in the form of higher tax autonomy are an effective way to constrain excessive
spending for the federal countries in my sample.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts for sub-national public
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finances of the EU15 countries. Section 3 summarizes the underlying theory and the related
literature. The empirical analysis starts in Section 4 with an explanation of my identification
strategy. Section 5 presents my dataset, and my results are shown and discussed in Section
6. This paper comes to a close in the Section 7.
2. Stylized facts
The structure of European countries differs in many respects. One of the most impor-
tant distinctions is the role and status of the sub-national sector due to the constitutional
structure.
[Table 1 about here]
Three countries out of the EU15 are original federations as written down in the respective
constitution (Austria, Belgium, Germany), and another country (Spain) has a very region-
alized structure. All these countries have had handed over important responsibilities to the
regional and local level, and these sub-national governments have significant own legislative
powers. I treat this group of countries as federations in my analysis. The other group of
states consists of unitary countries, but those may have a different number of sub-national
levels. While Finland has only a local level sector, the remaining unitary countries (Den-
mark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom) have at least one regional level, but with limited legal autonomy,
compared to their federal counterparts. As indicated in Table 1, I group all these countries
as unitary ones.
[Figure 1 about here]
European countries differ substantially in the level of sub-national debt which they have
accumulated in the past. Figure 1 shows the level of debt outstanding in 2008 as a share of
GDP in the top panel. This indicates that a substantial part of the total debt in European
countries is due to sub-national borrowing. Most federal countries, and in particular Ger-
many, show relatively large ratios of debt to GDP. However, this measure can be misleading,
since it does not take into account the actual size of the sub-national sector. Therefore, the
bottom panel depicts the outstanding debt as a share of revenues for the same year at the
sub-national sector. Measures in terms of revenues capture two important dimensions. First,
they indicate the relevance of debt in terms of the capacity to generate budgetary inflows.
Second, this measures the size of the sub-national sector as mentioned before.1 While the
ranking for federal countries remains largely the same, this further illustrates the differences
1The actual size might be also depicted in terms of expenditures, but note that the ordering of countries
does not change if I do so.
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in unitary countries. Even though the Nordic countries have much larger sub-national sec-
tors relative to the general government sector, their debt is lower compared to countries
such as Portugal or France, which are less decentralized.
Since debts are (at least formally)2 the accumulation of deficits over time, the paper
aims at answering the following questions. First, why did some federal countries, such as
Germany, have on average larger deficits than other federal countries? And second, what
drives the pattern of deficits over time in the unitary countries, even though the differences in
decentralization have been taken into account? To sum it up, I will explore why sub-national
sectors in some countries are exposed to a larger bias toward deficits than others.
3. Theoretical motivation and related empirical
literature
A well-established reasoning for differences in debts and deficits at any level of government
is that the respective decision makers do not fully internalize the costs of the public goods
they acquire. This is known as the common pool problem of public budgeting. Since
costs are shared by the whole population, theoretical models, as those of von Hagen and
Harden (1995), Velasco (2000), Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009), and Krogstrup
and Wyplosz (2010), emphasize that these costs are not fully internalized by the spending
claims of individual spending ministers, in the sub-national context by members of local
or regional councils. This results in overspending, since only a small part of the additional
social costs of raising the tax burden are taken into account, eventually creating a problem of
1/n. The more interest groups are involved in deciding the budget, the more fragmented the
budget process becomes, and the larger the deficit bias due to individual spending claims.
This is a result of a horizontal externality since it occurs within one government.
This point, which applies to every level of government, is supplemented by one that espe-
cially lets sub-national governments be inclined to overspend and borrow extensively. This
might occur because several sub-national entities are grabbing for resources out of a national
common pool (von Hagen, 2005). In this case the existence of soft budget constraints creates
a vertical externality. Bordignon (2006) provides a survey of this literature. When a budget
constraint is considered to be soft, a sub-national government can increase expenditures
without facing the full additional social costs. A hard budget constraint instead makes the
entity internalize the full additional social costs, since it expects to be responsible for the
consequences of its spending plans (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack, 2003).
The underlying problem is of a dynamic nature: sub-national governments can accumulate
unsustainable debt levels if they expect ex-ante that the central government might wish to
2See von Hagen and Wolff (2006) for a treatment of creative accounting and stock-flow adjustments.
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bail them out once fiscal obligations can no longer be fulfilled ex-post. In other words, sub-
national governments might expect that under certain circumstances the central government
will assume responsibility for the liabilities they accumulate. Thus, there is a link between
expectations of the future behavior of a higher-level government and the fiscal policy chosen
at present. One main channel of these expectations is intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
The probability that a sub-national entity is not responsible for its fiscal decisions taken
today is higher, the lower the share of own-source revenues is. In other words, the higher
the dependency on central governmental grants and transfers, the higher the expectation
of a bailout. This is because the central level has less room to ask for adjustments in sub-
national taxes in the case of fiscal trouble, resulting in a dynamic game between the two
actors (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996).
This “default-bailout game” between the central and sub-national level is formalized by
Inman (2001) and Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003). The center commits itself at the first
stage to a no-bailout policy. The sub-national level instead chooses to spend at a level where
the local marginal benefit is higher than the marginal social costs if it has a strong belief
that the commitment of the center at the first stage is not credible. Finally, the central
government has to decide whether or not to provide additional transfers to the lower level in
order to reduce the deficit there. If the center has strong incentives to do so, its actions will
be anticipated by the lower level government. The budget constraint is the softer, the lower
the costs of the center to provide additional funds compared to leaving the sub-national
government alone with its deficits.
Starting with Wildasin (1997), several papers formalized the problem in partial equilib-
rium models in order to analyze the effects of different issues on the prevalence of soft budget
constraints (see Vigneault (2006) for an extensive overview over theoretical considerations).
Wildasin (1997) focuses on the size and structure of jurisdictions. In his model the incen-
tives of the central government to intervene in lower-level public finances is due to positive
externalities of local public expenditures. Since these interventions can be anticipated at
the first stage, local budget constraints are soft. The model of Goodspeed (2002) shows that
a bailout forced by incentives of a lower level government to accumulate high debt has to
be paid partially by other regions through increased taxation. Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) inves-
tigates the impact of fiscal equalization schemes, and Breuille´, Madie`s, and Taugourdeau
(2006) focus on the impact of horizontal and vertical tax competition. For federal systems,
Breuille´ and Vigneault (2010) have recently shown that the soft budget problem can be
worse in a multi-tier system if regional level governments have discretion over transfer poli-
cies. In that case a soft budget constraint on the regional level yields even softer budget
constraints on the local level.
The theoretical interest in soft budget constraints in the context of fiscal federalism has
also triggered empirical contributions in this area. These studies focus either on cross-
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country evidence over aggregated fiscal policy on the sub-national level, or country specific
case studies. Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003) provide a collection of mostly descriptive
case studies. Additional country specific evidence for sub-national bailouts is provided by
von Hagen et al. (2000) for German states, Italian regions, Australian and Swedish local
jurisdictions.3 Evidence for Sweden is found by Dahlberg and von Hagen (2004). They
show that the ability of the central Swedish government to commit to a no-bailout policy
is rather weak, while the high degree of tax autonomy at the local level helps to harden
budget constraints. A recent study by Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) identifies the expectations
of local Swedish governments over a future discretionary grant by an instrumental variable
approach. He uses the grants received by neighboring municipalities as an instrument for
the anticipation of own additional future discretionary grants. A significant soft budget
effect is found, and on average debt is increased by 20 percent when the budget constraint
becomes soft. Apart from these studies, there is not much more empirical evidence at the
country level. The lack of empirical work can be explained by the fact that expectations
over the additional allocation of funds are not easy to measure, and as shown in the various
case studies, numerous aspects of intergovernmental relations can create this effect.
In order to solve the soft budget problem of time inconsistent behavior, countries charac-
terized by little revenue raising power at sub-national levels might impose more restrictions
through fiscal rules on lower level governments in order to commit the local or regional level
to fiscal discipline. Indeed, von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) show that borrowing lim-
its are more prevalent in countries where the share of sub-central government’s own-source
resources is small. This is because if own taxes could be adjusted, the central government
could deny a bailout. It has been also pointed out that these incentives might be different
according to the federal organization of countries.
Recent empirical work on fiscal rules at the general level of government across European
countries4 has established that their effectiveness depends on the institutional and political
background of the respective country. Evidence in von Hagen (2006) underpins the impor-
tance of the design of the budget process that enables the government to commit to the
rule. Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007) show that the stringency of fiscal targets
has an impact in European countries which are characterized by ideological dispersion in the
government. An intensive discussion of these results is provided in Hallerberg, Strauch, and
von Hagen (2009). Similar results are obtained by the study of Debrun et al. (2008), who
3Among others, further contributions deal with bailouts across the German states (Seitz, 2000; Fink and
Stratmann, 2011; Baskaran, 2012), Spanish regions (Sorribas-Navarro, 2011), and various Latin American
countries (e.g. Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner, 2002; Bevilaqua, 2002; Nicolini et al., 2002).
4For studies exploiting variation across US states see, among others, von Hagen (1991); Poterba (1994);
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995); Poterba (1996); Fata´s and Mihov (2006). Bohn and Inman (1996) find that
only constitutional rules prevent deficits in US states, while statutory ones do not. Feld and Kirchgassner
(2006) find that across Swiss cantons those with fiscal constraints have significantly lower deficits. In
addition, Alesina et al. (1999) show for a sample of Latin American countries that well designed budget
institutions reduce deficits.
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apply another indicator to capture the strictness of rules across European Union countries.
Empirical contributions that are closely related to this paper perform cross-country com-
parisons at the sub-national level, rather than investigating individual local or regional gov-
ernments. At the sub-national level fiscal rules and tax autonomy may have simultaneously
an influence on fiscal positions. This literature focuses on the differences across countries in
order to investigate which institutional elements have an impact on sub-national fiscal policy.
Rodden (2002, 2006) uses a panel-data set of forty-three OECD, developing, and developed
countries over ten years (1986 to 1996). A first set of results is based on ten-year average
regressions, capturing long-run effects. He finds that vertical fiscal imbalance (i.e. the share
of grants and shared taxes in revenues) is positively related to deficits. For a second set of
results all countries are grouped in two categories, countries with high and low borrowing
autonomy. For the former he finds that vertical fiscal imbalance is still a driving force of
deficits, while there is no effect for the latter. As already mentioned in the conclusion of
that paper, more work should be done to investigate the effects of tax autonomy, and in par-
ticular the changes over time and the different degrees of borrowing autonomy. Plekhanov
and Singh (2006) analyze with a panel-data set over 1982-2000 which specific institutional
design of borrowing constraints prevents large sub-national deficits. Their classification of
fiscal rules is based on dummies according to the way the rules are imposed. This paper
finds, while averaging over all years for each country, that rules imposed by the central
government and cooperative agreements might reduce deficits when the vertical imbalance
is large.
These days, however, almost all European sub-national governments are constrained by
some restrictions, and the pure classification into categories as in Plekhanov and Singh
(2006) is not without ambiguity. Another probable shortcoming of the existing empirical
literature is that none of the papers provide a panel analysis which takes the changes in
fiscal rules and tax autonomy over time into account. On the one hand, this is because time
invariant indicators are used, and hence institutional changes are neglected. On the other
hand, some results are based on between estimations, which were carried out on the average
of the variables per country over time. Fiscal rules differ over time and how stringent and
transparent they are applied. In particular European countries introduced numerous rules
for sub-national sectors over the last two decades. I use a continuous index, rather than a
categorical approach, to investigate whether the strictness of rules has an impact.
Similar arguments apply to the characterization of own-source revenues. The concept
of vertical fiscal imbalance should be carefully reconsidered, since it has not accounted for
shared taxes. But shared taxes, collected by the central and then redistributed to the lower
level sectors, might not be any different from grants in terms of incentives as tax rates cannot
be decided at the sub-national level. I rather focus on the development of own-source taxes,
which takes into account the distortionary nature of taxes, when central governments ask for
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adjustments by increasing tax rates rather than providing additional funds through bailouts
or by increasing grants. This is even more important since the underlying problem of soft
budget constraints is a dynamic one.
Solving these issues is one of the main contributions of this paper. I estimate panel
models where I carefully construct measures of the tax autonomy of sub-national sectors,
the different strength of borrowing restrictions in the form of fiscal rules, and explicitly take
into account the variation over time. This can be interpreted as comparing the outcome
for times before major reforms of rules and tax autonomy were implemented with the time
after implementation.
A further well known problem in the literature on fiscal rules is that their correlation with
deficits does not necessarily have to be causal. Studies on the national level have highlighted
the lack of good quality instruments in order to address a problem of endogeneity. This
explicit sub-national context, however, allows finding variables that are correlated with the
fiscal rules index, but are orthogonal to the error term. I exploit the fact that fiscal rules
are in almost all cases imposed by a higher level of government. Earlier contributions have
shown that political economy variables are able to explain the stringency of fiscal rules
(see Debrun et al. (2008), for instance). However, on the national level these variables
might not be simultaneously uncorrelated with budgetary outcomes. Although this is true
on the national level, in the case of sub-national sectors the decision makers over rules
(the central government) and the decision makers over budgetary policy (the sub-national
entities) are not the same. I will make use of the fact that the characteristics of central
governments, which impose rules on the sub-national one, are unlikely to be correlated with
their budgetary outcomes, but describe well the prevalence of rules. The attempt to solve
this endogeneity problem is another contribution of this paper compared to the existing
literature.
4. Identification
The main objective of this paper is to analyze whether a measure of the budgetary position
can be explained by autonomy over taxation and fiscal rules, as tools which might restrict
governments from profligacy. I estimate a reduced form model of a fiscal reaction function
according to equation (1):
Di,t = γtaxi,t−1 + δrulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (1)
The dependent variable is a measure of the budget deficit, Di,t, at the sub-national level. The
impact of the tax-structure in terms of sub-national autonomy is captured by the parameter
γ. I estimate the reaction to a lagged variable of the share of taxes which are under discretion
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of the respective government. I argue that using the one period lag is important since policy
makers will use their knowledge from the past to build their expectations about the future.
A high dependency on own-source taxes in the past indicates that it is likely that current
deficits must be paid back by own resources instead of expecting to receive transfers from
the central government.
The parameter δ captures the impact of fiscal rules, as an explicit way to restrict public
finances. The data section spends special attention to the question how the variables tax
and rules are constructed.
The impact of other explanatory control variables is measured by the parameters in the
vector β. µi and ηt are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. The inclusion of
individual fixed effects is, besides capturing unobserved heterogeneity, important to focus
on the dynamic nature of the underlying problem. I aim at an estimate of the impact
of changes in the institutional framework on budgetary outcomes in the form of annual
deficits. Hence, the question is how rules and autonomy affect deficits in the short run, and
the inclusion of fixed effects captures all time invariant factors.
It is important to take the connection of the sub-national level to the higher level of
government into account. The mechanism to tie the hands of lower-level governments by
giving them autonomy might work well in federations, where lower-level governments have
substantial degrees of freedom over their policies and legal acts. On the contrary, in unitary
countries the sub-national level is more or less the extension of central government policies.
When the sub-national level is not much more than a branch of the central one, a credible
commitment of the center to a no-bailout strategy might be impossible in any case (even in
line with a positive impact of autonomy on deficits).
Di,t = γΦ′taxi,t−1 + δΦ′rulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (2)
To capture these effects, I estimate models according to equation (2) and interact a set of
dummies Φ with the main variables of interest.
Φ′ =
 Φ1
Φ2
 and = 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local or regional level in a federal country, else 0
These dummies classify the respective form of government, as given in Table 1. Eventually
I end up with separate coefficients on tax autonomy and fiscal rules for federal and unitary
countries.
To address problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, I estimate cluster-robust
forms of the variance-covariance matrix. In some cases the small number of groups relative
to coefficients does not allow to cluster over countries. In that case I estimate the variance-
covariance matrix according to Newey and West (1987) with standard errors that are robust
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to both, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC).
As a robustness check, I also estimate dynamic models with a lagged dependent variable.
Unfortunately, this implies an additional problem, since fixed effects estimates are likely to
be biased as long as the time span is short (Nickell, 1981). To control for the bias introduced
by the lagged dependent variable together with fixed effects, I use the bias-corrected version
constructed by Bruno (2005) and bootstrap the standard errors. Judson and Owen (1999)
show that this is the appropriate choice for a panel with my characteristics, i.e. when neither
N nor T is large.
The possibility that fiscal rules are the result of, rather than the reason for fiscal per-
formance, requires a careful analysis of causality. I use an instrumental variable approach
to overcome this hurdle. First, I estimate the factors determining the fiscal rules index. I
include political determinants of the level of government which introduces the rules, indica-
tors of the general fiscal stance of the respective country, as well as dummies for different
time periods (the time of the Stability and Growth Pact, for instance) and further controls,
included in Z, into the model.
According to equation (3), I estimate a model for each value of the fiscal rules index j
across countries, using the average of covariates during the time span when the rule was
applied:
rulesj = γpolj + δbudgetj + θtimej + βZj + εj (3)
Furthermore I estimate a fixed effects model to capture the variance in rules over time
according to the model in equation (4):
rulesi,t = γpoli,t + δbudgeti,t + θtimei,t + βZi,t + µi + εi,t (4)
Ideally, this step offers candidates for instruments. Finally, I re-estimate equation (1) and
use instruments for the fiscal rules index. I spend additional attention to the validity of
instruments in Section 6.3.
This identification procedure corrects some drawbacks of former empirical approaches.
First, the focus on the within variance with time-varying indicators allows identification of
the effects in the short run. Second, including the lagged value of tax autonomy creates a
better reflection that decision makers form their expectations by observed values from the
previous period. Last, the proper choice of instruments can eliminate a potential source of
endogeneity.
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5. Data
I use aggregate data for sub-national sectors to investigate the deficit bias which might occur
due to the relationships between different governmental layers in European countries. All
EU15 members are included over a period ranging from 1995 to 2008. I include regional
and local governments as separate entities in the four federal organized member states. This
provides 19 observations per year and 266 in total over the fourteen years covered by my
data set.5
The dependent variable is a measure of the budgetary position in each year. While several
possible definitions are at hand, I chose to use annual deficits as a share of revenues. Other
possibilities are defining the dependent variable as the deficit per capita or as a share of
GDP. I took the decision in favor of my choice, since this measure incorporates differences
in capabilities to raise revenues, as the deficit is expressed as a share of the revenue capacity
in a given year.6
Two important indicators have to be computed in order to investigate the effects of fiscal
rules and tax autonomy. I construct both indicators as a time-varying index that captures
the development for each country over the entire time period.
First, an indicator of tax autonomy is needed to test whether the dependency on own tax
resources creates incentives to balance the books. The smaller the share of revenues from
own-source taxation is, the higher the expectation over a bailout in times of fiscal stress.
I compute an indicator of the share of own-source tax revenues in total revenues on each
governmental level, respectively. The classification of own-source revenues is, unfortunately,
not straightforward. Other studies rely on the degree of vertical imbalance or the share
of taxes in total revenues, which can be misleading.7 It is important to distinguish real
own-source revenues from revenues which arise due to tax-sharing arrangements, i.e. taxes
collected by a higher level and automatically transferred to the lower one. The OECD
(1999) provides a classification of the taxing power of sub-national levels. Unfortunately,
their Fiscal Decentralization Database provides only information for two or at most three
years, 1995, 2002, and 2005. I use the Revenue Statistics of the OECD, the Taxes in
Europe database of the European Commission, numerous national sources over changes in
tax-systems, and the information provided by Stegarescu (2005) to construct an indicator
over the entire 14 years of the sample. I treat all taxes over which either discretion on rates,
reliefs, or both are under the power of the sub-national entity as own-source tax revenues.
5Please refer to Appendix D for robustness checks on alternative sample designs. Main results remain
unchanged.
6Taking deficits as a share of revenues or expenditures as the dependent variable follows the previous
studies in this literature. However, the correlation with other possible measures, as expressing deficits as a
share of GDP or in per capita terms, is high. See Table 9 in the Appendix A for details.
7A good example are German federal states. Their share of tax revenues in total revenues is substantial,
but the share of real own-source taxes is close to zero since they cannot decide on an individual tax rate.
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This measure does not overestimate the revenue autonomy in the presence of shared taxes.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of this indicator. The Nordic countries are
characterized by the largest share of autonomous revenues while German states, both Aus-
trian sectors, Ireland, and the Netherlands have on average very little discretion over their
revenues. Variation in the indicator is generated due to two different effects. On the one
hand, the tax-system can be changed, equipping lower level governments with a richer set of
instruments or more autonomy over existing taxes. Some governmental sectors, such as the
Spanish regions and the sub-national Italian sector have implemented considerable changes
within this period. On the other hand, the share of other revenues could also shift when
the center re-allocates resources to lower levels of government. An increasing value of this
indicator represents a higher responsibility at the sub-national level and might help to avoid
soft budget constraints.
Second, I construct another indicator to depict the strength of fiscal rules, i.e. how
stringent borrowing is regulated. Fiscal rules are nowadays frequently used at the sub-
national level in European countries (European Commission, 2009, 2008, 2006; Sutherland,
Price, and Joumard, 2005) to mitigate a deficit bias and to harden the budget constraint by
imposing numerical targets on budgetary variables or limiting the access to credits. I use
the data provided by the European Commission (2009) to create an index of the strictness
of these rules. All fiscal rules which can have an impact on the deficit are included in the
calculation of the index. These are balanced-budget-rules, debt brakes, and other restrictions
on borrowing.8 The original EU index is adjusted to the situation of sub-national levels. In
the non-federal countries, an average of the rules applying to different levels, weighted by
their share of expenditures in the total sub-national budget, is used.9
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the development of this indicator. The restrictions are relatively stable
over time in one group of countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, and Finland)
while another group (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden) has increased
the strictness of rules in recent years. Most of these countries introduced national stability
pacts as an answer to the limitations arising from European supranational rules. A third
group (Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) goes without strict
rules. When these fiscal arrangements worked as an effective tool to dampen a deficit bias,
a negative coefficient is expected.
8Expenditure ceilings are very rare at the sub-national level and, as in the original EU variable, excluded
for the main analysis of the impact of rules on deficits.
9The construction of this index is described in detail in Appendix C.
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The other controls are summarized in Table 2. The fiscal position of the central gov-
ernment def cg rev is included to capture a copycat effect. Sub-national governments that
observe a loose fiscal policy at the national level can follow the example given by the central
government, expecting that they are not sanctioned if the higher level is profligate as well.
[Table 2 about here]
The degree of decentralization is taken into account by the share of sub-national expendi-
tures in general government expenditures edec. Unfortunately, this indicator is not able to
distinguish between expenditures that could be categorized as compulsory or those that are
optional. Nevertheless, the share of expenditures captures the weight of the sub-national
sector in the general budget and how spending proportions are shared between the govern-
mental levels. These shares differ across European countries, with varying responsibilities
and discretion over their exercises.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the country means over my period of study. The Nordic countries, for in-
stance, are characterized by a high level of services and responsibilities on the local level.
Danish sub-national governments spend on average more than every second Danske kroner,
followed by their Swedish and Finnish neighbors. The regional levels of Belgium, Spain,
and Germany are responsible for approximately one quarter of total expenditures, accom-
panied by their local governments with additional, but lower expenditure shares. The less
decentralized countries are France, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Greece. The plot against
the average of own-source tax revenues indicates that in many cases higher expenditure de-
centralization is accompanied by a higher degree of autonomy over tax revenues. As noted
before, this is not the case for some countries, in particular for the German federal states,
but also not for Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Additional covariates are included to capture cyclical and institutional effects and to
consider the spending needs of lower-level governments. I include the output gap outgap,
the unemployment rate unempl, the ratio of the working age to total population depratio,
the log of total population ln totpop, and interest expenses intexp rev. All fiscal variables
are computed as share of revenues.
Table 3 summarizes the additional political variables, which I take into account for the
estimation of fiscal rules themselves. The motivation for the central government to impose
restrictions on lower level governments could be determined by the perception that a soft
budget problem is at hand. Thus, the federal structure itself plays a role and several de-
terminants of the deficit might also be crucial for the strictness of rules. These issues are
taken into account by using some of the variables already discussed. However, the center
must also believe that fiscal rules are a mean to cure the problem and must be able to im-
plement the rules through the legislature. Hence, political variables which characterize the
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central government and its preferences are related to fiscal rules, since they describe general
preferences for a rules based framework. Most of the data is obtained from the World Bank
Database of Political Institutions 2009 (Beck et al., 2001).
[Table 3 about here]
First, to control if the ideological orientation of the government plays a role, an index over
the two main government parties, reaching from zero (left-wing, single party government) to
one (right-wing, single party government), is calculated. There is no general conjecture over
the direction of the impact of this variable, and the sign could point in either direction.10
Second, the Herfindahl index measures the fractionalization of the ruling coalition. A
single party government yields a value of one, while values close to zero indicate a more
dispersed government. This index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly
picked members of the ruling coalition belong to the same party. The expected sign of this
variable is not clear. On the one hand, a more fragmented government could be willing
to restrict lower levels, because they are able to blame other coalition members when local
or regional politicians complain about new rules. On the other hand, a less fragmented
government might find it easier to pass new rules through the legislature.
Third, the district magnitude measures the average number of seats in the parliament
per electoral district. Beside the impact on the effective number of parties,11 the district
magnitude might have an additional impact in the sub-national context. A higher value
indicates that more seats are allocated within one electoral district. Hence, the connection
between local politics and the politicians elected into the central parliament might be loose.
On the contrary, a small district magnitude means that the representative in the central
legislature could be seen as directly responsible for the respective district. A strong con-
nection to the sub-national level might cause representatives to be cautious with imposing
strict rules, because they do not want to cross with local politicians and voters.
Last, I include the predicted form of fiscal governance, according to von Hagen and Harden
(1995), Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2007), and Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen
(2009). This literature characterizes whether a delegation or contract approach of fiscal
governance is appropriate for different countries. Centralizing the budget process could be
done by the former approach under which governments give authority to one special member
that is vested with special strategic power. On the national level the finance minister is
typically in charge of this special function. The latter approach instead relies on contracts
between all members of the cabinet with spending rights. I include the indicator developed
in this literature to investigate whether central governments that are assumed to be contract
countries follow this approach when designing rules for sub-national levels.
10Debrun et al. (2008) report evidence that more conservative orientated governments make less use of
fiscal rules.
11The idea was developed by Duverger (1954), tested empirically by Taagepera and Shugart (1993) and
put in the context of budgetary politics by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).
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6. Results
This section presents the results of my analysis. After estimating the baseline model in the
first subsection, I investigate the factors which determine the strictness of fiscal frameworks
in the second subsection. The goal is to identify the driving forces behind fiscal rules in
order to use them as instruments for instrumental variable estimations when fiscal rules
are treated as endogenous. The results from these estimations are presented in the last
subsection, where I also discuss my findings in more detail.
6.1. The impact of sub-national fiscal rules on budgetary
outcomes
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions for budgetary outcomes. The dependent
variable in any model is the share of the annual deficit in revenues at the respective sub-
national sector. Positive values arise if expenditures exceed revenues and all coefficients
with a negative sign improve the budgetary position by reducing deficits.
[Table 4 about here]
The first two columns show results from regressions according to equation (1), while the first
column (a) does not include neither individual nor time fixed effects, but panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSE). I find neither significant effects of the lagged tax autonomy nor
the strength of fiscal rules when I pool all observations and include a dummy variable for
federal countries. As mentioned earlier, including fixed effects is superior to cross section
models since the variation within groups over time is important. Fixed effects also capture
time-invariant preferences for fiscal sustainability. In addition, an F-test (F(18,216)=6.21,
p-value 0.00) indicates that significant individual effects are at present and simple cross
section estimations are not efficient. Therefore, I turn to fixed effect models in columns
(b) to (e), since a Hausman test rejects the appropriateness of random effects (χ2(12)=42.49,
p-value=0.00).
Results of model (b) are similar to those from the cross section without any significant
effect of tax autonomy or fiscal rules on deficits. As abovementioned, the means to cure the
deficit bias might be different conditional on whether the respective country is a unitary
one or a federation. To control for the likely different effects I turn to the estimation of
specification (2) from column (c) onwards.
These estimations show encouraging results. The lagged tax autonomy is significant for
both types of government. Interestingly, coefficients are different across the two groups.
According to the hypothesis of soft budget constraints, sub-national governments in federa-
tions run lower deficits when their share of own-source tax revenues in the previous year has
been a relatively large share in total revenues. Given an increase in the share of revenues
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directly at their hands, it might be perceived that these own generated revenues also have
to be used for potential future liabilities, causing lower present deficits. Sub-national sectors
in unitary countries instead show up with an opposing behavior. These governments might
anticipate that they are more or less the extension of the central government and giving
them more autonomy does not constrain them sufficiently from profligate spending. Nev-
ertheless, when I estimate the model with cluster robust standard errors in column (d), or
a dynamic specification in column (e), tax autonomy in unitary countries is not significant
anymore. These findings are in line with those of Rodden (2002): more autonomy over
revenues generated by own-source taxation is an implicit tool to constraint sub-national
governments in federal organized countries. Although effective in federations, this does not
work for unitary countries.
Fortunately, fiscal rules do, but only for the group of unitary countries. Sub-national
governments in non-federal states overspend less when fiscal rules are stricter and the access
to borrowing is limited. In this case, fiscal rules are an effective tool to mitigate a deficit
bias, although tax autonomy is not. However, this does not hold true for entities in federally
organized states, where in no specification a significant coefficient is detected. The result
of the dynamic model in column (e) corroborates this result. Fiscal rules prevent only
sub-national sectors in non-federal countries from running high deficits. For the rest of the
paper, I consider model (d) as the preferred benchmark estimation.
Summing up, different types of institutional designs call for different means to control
sub-national public finances. A careful consideration of the intergovernmental relations is
required when fiscal rules should be implemented. Given the overall legal autonomy, which
is characteristical for federal countries, higher autonomy over taxes yields on average lower
deficits. On the other hand, a framework based on fiscal rules works well in unitary organized
countries. This is likely to be the case because these governments have no instruments or
enough legal autonomy to circumvent the limitations.
The other covariates are in line with expectations. Lower level governments follow the
example of the center, since larger deficits on that level are positively correlated with those on
the sub-national level. Countries that are more decentralized in terms of expenditure shares
also run on average higher deficits. Demographic changes reveal two interesting insights.
First, when the total population grows, so do deficits. Local services are often connected to
the number of people that call for them; hence more people represent larger spending needs.
Second, when the share of the working population grows, budgetary positions improve. All
other variables do not have an impact on deficits which is significantly different from zero
in any model.12
12The dynamic model shows only a significant effect of total population, while for all other variables
estimates are not significantly different from zero.
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6.2. The determinants of sub-national fiscal rules
Whereas national fiscal rules are often self imposed, sub-national rules are not. They are
almost always imposed by the central level, and institutional and political variables of that
level have an impact on the strictness of the rules themselves. Even though one can argue
that in federal countries the regional level could impose rules on the local one, this has not
been observed over the last decades. The new fiscal frameworks in Spain and Austria for
instance were both imposed on all sub-national levels by the central government.13 This
section explores which factors induce a higher reliance on rules, and which circumstances
might trigger the adoption of rules.
[Table 5 about here]
The first column of Table 5 presents the results from an OLS regression according to equation
(3) of each single outcome of the fiscal rules index on the average values over the period
in which one set of rules was in force in a given country.14 In other words, each value of
the fiscal rules index appearing in a country is regressed on the average values of all other
covariates during that time. This simple approach reveals interesting insights, at which I
look with more sophisticated methods according to equation (4) in columns (b) to (e). The
first two remaining models (b and c) provide cross-sectional evidence, and the last two (d
and e) show results from fixed effect estimations. Models (c) and (e) include also the lagged
value of the rules index in order to account for the persistency of this variable.
The top panel of the table shows the impact of political variables on the rules index.
The first variable herfgov is significant and negative in almost all specifications, except the
dynamic ones in models (c) and (e). A government which consists of a single party or of
one big and one small coalition member, represented by a higher value of the Herfindahl
fractionalization index (i.e. a less fractionalized one), tends to impose less strict rules.
One-party governments might receive more leeway from their sub-national counterparts and
might try to avoid this conflict. Countries that are supposed to follow a contract approach
of fiscal governance at the central level (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2009) impose
less strict rules on their sub-national governments. The district magnitude also becomes
significant and positive in the panel specifications.15 This supports the view that rather
loose connections to lower level politics increase the use of fiscal rules at the sub-national
level.
13Self imposed rules of particular regional governments and their local counterparts are a somewhat new
phenomenon. My sample covers data up to 2008, and none of the rules was self imposed by a regional level
or imposed by that level on the local government sector.
14The interpretation of dummies that vary over time such as elections or the stability and growth pact are
in this estimation an indicator over the relative number of events in the respective time span. For example,
sgp takes the value 0.6 if the rules was valid during 6 years of the Stability and Growth Pact.
15Due to the little within variance, I check whether this result is robust when I include time dummies.
The parameter is still significant at the same level.
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None of the other political variables, and neither budgetary ones, have an impact on the
rules themselves. It is important to note that this implies that sub-national deficits do not
have a feedback effect on rules. The only budgetary variable which is significant in at least
one specification is the lagged debt level of the general government in the panel specification
(d). Central governments impose restrictions when general fiscal stress is at hand, but do
not react to deficits at the sub-national level.
In terms of timing, the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact has (from 1999
onwards) increased the strength of rules. This effect is not surprising since most national
stability pacts were introduced as an answer to the supranational European fiscal framework
in order to force the lower level governments not to counteract central level fiscal policies.
Also not surprising is that rules increase over time, as indicated by the included linear
trend. Out of the other control variables only the demographic structure, the population
size, the sub-national tax autonomy, and unemployment have an increasing impact on the
implementation of fiscal rules.
To sum up, the fractionalization of the government in power, the district magnitude, and
the predicted form of fiscal governance determine the strictness of sub-national fiscal rules.
Ideology of the central government and national elections instead do not. Neither do the
budgetary variables, beside the lagged overall level of debt, as long as a static model is
estimated. However, constituencies in federal countries, as indicated by the two dummies
against the base group of unitary countries, rely more on rules than their non federal coun-
terparts. Given the results over the effectiveness of fiscal rules from the previous section,
those countries seem to back the wrong horse. This also could indicate that the political
actions of the center to implement rules in unitary and federal countries might be different.
In particular, the timing when the center implements rules, and whether the present or
lagged political variables matter, may differ as the ultimate results have suggested.
[Table 6 about here]
The estimations presented in Table 6 show that this is indeed the case. Model (a) to (e)
include separate coefficients for federations and unitary states as well as their one period lag
for one of the political variables per estimated equation, respectively. For example, column
(a) shows a regression with four different coefficients for the impact of the Herfindahl index
on rules: the current value of federal countries, the lagged value of federal countries, the
current value of unitary countries, and finally the lagged value for this group. Models (b) to
(e) continue with this procedure for the other covariates. Column (f) shows the estimates
of the full model, including lagged and current values of all variables simultaneously.
Model (a) shows that it is rather the one period lag than the current value of the Herfind-
ahl index which matters. Furthermore, it can be seen that federal countries do not follow
the direction described above. In this case there is a positive relationship, indicating that
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less fractionalization is associated with stricter rules. In federal countries the central govern-
ment might impose those stricter rules in order to tie the hands of sub-national politicians,
which might belong to a different party. A ideological position of central governments which
is contrary to the majority of sub-national ones is a frequently observed feature in federal
countries. Surprisingly ideology is now marginal significant at the 90% level for unitary
countries when the lags of all variables are included in the model as shown in (f). Election
year effects (b) instead are still not observable. As for fractionalization, also the district
magnitude seems to be more important one period lagged for unitary countries, but ac-
cording to estimation (d) and (f) signs do not change. A higher value of this variable is
still increasing the rules index. The contract approach in central governments’ fiscal policy
instead is different for both types of countries with respect to the timing. For the federal
ones the actual one is significant and negative, while for the unitary states the one period
lagged value matters.
These results, while interesting on their own, are important to answer a last open question,
namely the causality between rules and fiscal outcomes. My instrumental variable approach,
presented in the next sub-section, builds on the results derived above. It is important to
keep in mind that the proper choice of instruments can be different for the two distinct
types of countries.
6.3. Endogeneity, IV results, and discussion
The relationship between budgetary outcomes and fiscal rules might be confounded by po-
tential endogeneity of the latter. The enacted fiscal policy could be the cause for - rather
than the result of the adoption of fiscal rules. In this case countries with fiscal difficulties
at the sub-national level might impose stricter rules. The different stringency of fiscal rules
across countries could be also driven by an omitted variable, in particular preferences for
fiscal discipline, as noted by Poterba (1996). If balanced budgets attain an outstanding
status in some states, those countries might impose stricter rules according to their prefer-
ences. However, as those preferences are assumed to not change a lot over time, this effect
is captured by including individual fixed effects. Nevertheless, it has to be secured that the
impact of rules on deficits, as estimated in section 6.1, is indeed going from tighter rules to
better budgetary positions (at least in unitary countries).
I use an instrumental variables approach to solve this question. Variables that satisfy
the two properties of valid instruments, namely being uncorrelated with the error of the
regression of equation (2), but highly correlated with the rules index, must be found. This is
usually regarded as a complicated task: explanations for the prevalence of fiscal institutions,
for instance political variables which reflect preferences, might be simultaneously connected
to the result of fiscal policy. This would imply that they are correlated with the variable
that captures fiscal rules, but also with the error term.
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The context of sub-national budgetary outcomes instead offers a convenient feature to
tackle this hurdle. Rules and institutions for lower level governments are introduced by a
higher level of government. The characteristics that drive the introduction of the rules, as
worked out in Section 6.2, are correlated with the rules itself (and might be correlated with
the budgetary outcomes of that higher governmental level), but not with the budgetary po-
sition of the governments where the rules are imposed on. The previous section has shown
that political characteristics of the central government are indeed related to the strictness of
rules. In addition, there was no feedback effect of deficits, which excludes that central gov-
ernments introduce rules when sub-national deficits are regarded as unsustainable. Hence,
there are possible candidates for a set of excluded instruments which are correlated with the
endogenous fiscal rules variables, but are not correlated with the error term in the explana-
tory equation. In other words, those variables are likely to be in line with the exclusion
restriction in instrumental variable regressions.
[Table 7 about here]
I use the variables which are, according to the previous section, found to be correlated with
the fiscal rules index as instruments. These are the interacted district magnitude, the form
of fiscal governance, and the Herfindahl index of government fractionalization. The results
of these regressions are shown in Table 7.16 Column (a) repeats the estimation without
instruments for comparison. Models (b) and (c) differ only in the way how standard errors
are computed. The set of instruments for these two estimations contains the actual political
variables for federations, but the one-period lag for unitary countries. The absolute value of
the coefficient on fiscal rules in unitary countries is now more or less twice as large as before.
This indicates that the earlier estimate was biased towards zero. In terms of significance both
models make the same predictions, and surprisingly also tax autonomy in unitary countries
is gaining significance. The positive coefficient, however, indicates that higher autonomy
in this group of countries does not work as a limitation but rather as an augmentation for
deficits. In contrast to federations, sub-national governments in unitary countries are more
or less a branch of the center and they may assume the center to take over liabilities anyway.
The model in column (d) uses the full set of instruments (i.e. lagged and current values)
for both the federal and unitary fiscal rules index. The results are similar to the previous
ones, but the validity of instruments changes slightly. While none of the models is affected by
overidentification (note that the Hansen J-test does always accept the null of joint validity17),
the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for weak identification in models (b) and (c) is superior to
(d). Since the models with different instruments for the unitary and federal index works
better, all instruments might not be suited equally well for the two groups.
16I report the first stage estimations for all regressions using instruments in Appendix B.
17The joint null is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. both requirements are fulfilled: they
are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments do not have to be included into the
estimated equation.
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To shows this in detail, I present separate regressions for each type of country in Table 8.
[Table 8 about here]
The estimations labeled ’I’ include only the unitary countries, while those labeled ’II’ include
local and regional sectors of federations. Models (a) use the full set of instruments, while (b)
involves only current values and (c) only lagged values, respectively. Signs and significances
of the two main variables of interest do not change compared to the estimations before. A
higher degree of tax autonomy still mitigates the deficit bias in federations and exaggerates
deficits in unitary countries. Rules continue to prevent deficits in unitary countries in all
specifications, but with the additional insight that the proper choice of instruments depends
on the type of the country. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic reveals that actual values are
better suited as instruments for federal organized countries, while this is true for the one
period lags for estimating the effect in unitary countries. Also control variables behave
differently, and federal countries respond stronger to cyclical elements such as the output
gap, unemployment, and deficits at the central level. At the end of the day these regressions
confirm and robustify the earlier conclusions.
[Figure 5 about here]
These results are encouraging for policy makers. Figure 5 depicts the marginal effect of
stricter rules in unitary countries in the top panel (a) and the effect of tax autonomy in
federations in the bottom panel (b). The bars on the left show the actual value of the fiscal
rules index and tax autonomy in the year 2008. Significant improvements of budgetary
positions are potentially feasible through reforms of rule frameworks and the structure of
tax systems. This is particularly true for countries which currently make little use of those
mechanisms. A one standard deviation in unitary countries (0.303, cf. Table 2) increase in
the rules index decreases the annual share of deficits in revenues on average by 2.7 percent.
A one standard deviation increase in the tax autonomy of federations (0.122, cf. Table 2)
causes a reduction of deficits of about 3.5 percent, ceteris paribus. Hence changes in the
institutional framework, in particular the adoption of another set of fiscal rules or changing
autonomy over taxes, can help to reduce deficits in the short run.
A last issue is whether these two instruments work in isolation or whether there is an
interplay between the two. To check for this, I re-estimate the model and allow for interaction
between the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy.18
[Figure 6 about here]
The top panel (a) in Figure 6 shows a plot of the marginal effect of fiscal rules in unitary
countries. The interaction term is not significant in this case (p-value=0.6, cf. Table 10 in
18Estimates are shown in Table 10 of Appendix B.
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the appendix). The negative impact on deficits remains similar in terms of magnitude when
tax autonomy varies.
Tax autonomy itself was identified as the proper tool for federal countries. The marginal
effect in this case is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 6. Here the interaction term is
significant (p-value=0.03, cf. Table 10 in the appendix) and the figure shows that this tool
becomes more effective when fiscal rules are tighter. That is, even though rules themselves
do not help, an increase in tax autonomy should be considered together with the rules
framework. In the policy arena, these results and in particular the fact that the effectiveness
of tools to restrict deficits depends on the countries’ type should be carefully taken into
consideration.
7. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to explore which institutional arrangements help to keep the
books of sub-national governments in balance. I focused on two different mechanisms which
are potentially able to constrain the sub-national sector from fiscal profligacy. On the one
hand I investigated the role of own tax resources, since less autonomy creates incentives to
run deficits because of bailout expectations. On the other hand, I studied the impact of
fiscal rules, which a central government might impose to restrict the sub-national sector.
My main findings are that a well designed framework of fiscal rules works in unitary
countries, but not per se in federations. Because of the higher autonomy which local and
regional governments in federal countries enjoy, a rules based framework does not help in this
case. Here, it is rather higher legal autonomy over tax instruments that might prevent large
deficits at the sub-national sector as a form of market-preserving federalism (Weingast,
1995). These findings suggest that the choice of tools depends critically on the type of
government and the constitutional structure. This complements the literature of fiscal rules
on the general government level, where the political environment and the electoral system,
for instance, are important determinants for the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Hallerberg,
Strauch, and von Hagen, 2007). As a result, a suitable framework needs to be tailored to
the characteristics of a specific country. More stringent rules do not always result in more
desirable outcomes and neither does a general restriction of tax autonomy.
This paper is a further step in sub-national public finance in order to explore how deficits
could be avoided and large debts prevented. My findings suggest several issues for future
research. The next step should be to make use of decentralized data for several European
countries. This allows investigating additional effects which occur horizontally within the
sub-national governments in combination with the vertical dimension between governmen-
tal levels, as explored in this paper. Another interesting point is the recent introduction
of self-imposed fiscal rules in some regions of federal countries. Federations often grant au-
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tonomy to sub-national governments which allows them to adopt rules by themselves. The
German state of Hesse for example, has held a referendum and 70% of voters opted for the
introduction of a fiscal rule into the regional constitution. Since self-imposed rules might be
an important signal to the markets and reflect the preferences of voters, effects might differ
from those of centrally imposed rules in federations. The evaluation of the effectiveness is
an interesting task for future research, once enough data is available.
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Figure 1: Sub-national outstanding debt
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federal countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain
(local and regional levels included seperately)
unitary countries Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom
(consoldidated sub-national values included)
Table 1: Unitary and federal classification
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Figure 2: Revenues from own-source taxation
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Figure 3: Fiscal rules index
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Figure 4: Decentralization over 1995-2008
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
deficit/revenues Eurostat overall 0.006 0.034 -0.100 0.112
between 0.022 -0.042 0.062
within 0.026 -0.087 0.101
Tax autonomy
tax1 OECD, overall 0.227 0.172 0.000 0.646
own calculations between 0.173 0.003 0.625
within 0.037 0.061 0.370
tax ∗ federal overall 0.152 0.122 0.000 0.343
tax ∗ unitary overall 0.281 0.184 0.041 0.646
Fiscal rules
rules2 EC, overall 0.459 0.357 0.000 1.284
own calculations between 0.311 0.000 1.100
within 0.188 -0.014 1.061
rules ∗ federal overall 0.699 0.277 0.000 1.284
rules ∗ unitary overall 0.284 0.303 0.000 1.008
Controls
def cg rev3 Eurostat overall 0.081 0.113 -0.189 0.621
between 0.074 -0.031 0.276
within 0.087 -0.169 0.556
edec4 Eurostat overall 0.254 0.131 0.043 0.659
between 0.131 0.054 0.598
within 0.029 0.116 0.360
intexp rev5 Eurostat overall 0.942 1.307 0.004 5.875
between 1.303 0.007 5.382
within 0.306 0.042 2.256
outgap Eurostat overall 0.374 1.648 -4.707 5.209
between 0.372 -0.111 1.429
within 1.608 -4.540 5.376
ln totpop Eurostat overall 16.496 1.290 12.913 18.229
between 1.323 12.999 18.225
within 0.028 16.410 16.614
depratio6 Eurostat overall 0.670 0.012 0.636 0.690
between 0.011 0.646 0.685
within 0.006 0.640 0.687
unempl7 Eurostat overall 0.075 0.031 0.019 0.184
between 0.027 0.034 0.123
within 0.017 0.036 0.137
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1revenues from own-source taxes as share of total revenues; 2fiscal rules index; 3central govern-
ment deficit as share of revenues; 4 share of sub-national expenditures in general government expenditures; 5
interest expenditures as share of revenues; 6 share of working population in total population; 7unemployment
rate
Table 2: Summary statistics: Deficit estimation
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ideology1 World Bank, overall 0.376 0.327 0.000 1.000
own calculations between 0.131 0.089 0.589
Beck et al. (2001) within 0.301 -0.213 1.171
herfgov2 World Bank overall 0.666 0.270 0.181 1.000
Beck et al. (2001) between 0.257 0.221 1.000
within 0.101 0.350 1.004
disctrict3 World Bank overall 9.402 6.050 1.000 22.500
Beck et al. (2001) between 5.712 1.000 20.300
within 2.364 5.052 25.352
contract4 Hallerberg et al. (2009) overall 0.425 0.495 0.000 1.000
between 0.465 0.000 1.000
within 0.199 0.068 1.282
debt gg gdp5 Eurostat overall 0.634 0.265 0.061 1.304
between 0.255 0.071 1.102
within 0.091 0.406 1.019
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1index from zero (single party left-wing) to one (single party right-wing); 2Herfindahl measure
of fractionalization (probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different political groups);
3district magnitude; 4 form of fiscal governance; 5debt at the general government level as share of gdp
Table 3: Summary statistics: Central government characteristics
35
Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.006 -0.101
(0.023) (0.061)
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.195 0.153
(0.098) (0.120) (0.096)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.159*
(0.069) (0.056) (0.087)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.010)
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Controls
def cg rev 0.066** 0.087** 0.076** 0.076* 0.060*
(0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035)
edec 0.100*** 0.147* 0.214** 0.214*** 0.127
(0.026) (0.088) (0.087) (0.074) (0.078)
intexp rev 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
outgap -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl 0.173 -0.036 -0.047 -0.047 0.001
(0.123) (0.216) (0.209) (0.187) (0.193)
ln totpop 0.007* 0.365** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.324**
(0.004) (0.180) (0.167) (0.136) (0.133)
depratio 0.326 -0.565* -0.603* -0.603* -0.356
(0.258) (0.322) (0.331) (0.356) (0.396)
trend 0.002*** 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
federal 0.005
(0.009)
LDV 0.368***
(0.069)
country/year FE No/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
R2 0.181 0.223 0.270 0.270
Standard errors in parentheses, see notes for details
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors; Model (b) and (c): fixed effect
estimation with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (d):
clustered standard errors at the individual level; Model (e) dynamic panel data estimation, bias correction
initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator, bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions, LDV is the
lagged dependent variable.
Table 4: Regressions of deficits
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Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Political variables
herfgov -0.641** -0.226** -0.066 -0.394*** -0.138
(0.231) (0.091) (0.074) (0.131) (0.087)
election -0.139 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.015
(0.233) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
ideology -0.112 -0.014 -0.014 0.036 0.011
(0.103) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
district 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.018*** 0.007*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
contract -0.501** -0.150** -0.064 -0.281*** -0.006
(0.182) (0.070) (0.057) (0.069) (0.051)
Budgetary variables
def rev -0.710 -0.160 -0.156 -0.119 -0.094
(1.754) (0.256) (0.244) (0.269) (0.320)
def rev(t−1) -0.195 -0.111 -0.356 -0.045
(0.262) (0.247) (0.313) (0.291)
debt gg gdp(t−1) -0.036 -0.004 -0.011 0.384** 0.083
(0.169) (0.094) (0.048) (0.153) (0.132)
Timing
sgp 0.374** 0.050* 0.061** 0.063* 0.072**
(0.156) (0.028) (0.025) (0.038) (0.028)
trend 0.018*** 0.002 0.020*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
continues on next page...
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Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Controls
depratio 2.210 3.487* 0.565 7.055** 0.805
(3.315) (2.077) (1.164) (2.816) (1.978)
outgap 0.050 -0.005 0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(0.036) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
unempl 3.337* 0.490 0.242 0.848 -0.597
(1.833) (1.155) (1.120) (1.757) (1.412)
unempl(t−1) 0.688 0.301 -1.464 0.520
(1.080) (0.993) (1.528) (1.300)
tax 0.879** 0.538* 0.422 0.717* 0.717*
(0.363) (0.318) (0.339) (0.398) (0.390)
tax(t−1) 0.561* -0.135 1.350*** -0.097
(0.313) (0.339) (0.407) (0.383)
ln totpop 0.066 0.083*** 0.030* -0.022 0.580
(0.051) (0.029) (0.016) (0.821) (0.681)
edec 0.597 0.200 0.147 -0.594 -0.070
(0.359) (0.197) (0.109) (0.362) (0.324)
local dummy 0.203* 0.353*** 0.101**
(0.100) (0.068) (0.040)
regional dummy 0.291*** 0.436*** 0.117***
(0.102) (0.067) (0.043)
LDV 0.698*** 0.803***
(0.067) (0.065)
Constant -2.484 -3.780** -0.920
(2.350) (1.591) (0.874)
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.888 0.501 0.853 0.637
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) n=41, (2)-(5) n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): aggregated estimation according to equation 3; Models (b) and (c): pooled regression
with panel corrected standard errors; Model (d): fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (e): bias correction initialized by Arellano and
Bond estimator, bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions, LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
Table 5: Determinants of fiscal rules
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effect Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Herfindahl index (fractionalization)
herfgov -0.381*** -0.387*** -0.443*** -0.358***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.132) (0.132)
herfgov ∗ federal -0.006 -0.078
(0.114) (0.116)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal 0.313*** 0.359***
(0.106) (0.102)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.335 -0.233
(0.229) (0.189)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.482* -0.641***
(0.274) (0.244)
Election year
election 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
election ∗ federal 0.038 0.038
(0.028) (0.025)
election(t−1) ∗ federal 0.011 -0.008
(0.021) (0.016)
election ∗ unitary 0.003 -0.004
(0.024) (0.021)
election(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.010 -0.012
(0.027) (0.023)
Ideology (1=right-wing single party)
ideology 0.056** 0.041 0.082*** 0.029
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
ideology ∗ federal -0.063 0.027
(0.040) (0.030)
ideology(t−1) ∗ federal 0.021 -0.011
(0.032) (0.030)
ideology ∗ unitary 0.055 0.075*
(0.052) (0.041)
ideology(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.069 0.057
(0.048) (0.042)
District magnitude
district 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
district ∗ federal -0.005 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.006 0.009**
(0.005) (0.005)
district ∗ unitary 0.011* 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003)
continues on next page...
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Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Contract
contract -0.290*** -0.281*** -0.302*** -0.282***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
contract ∗ federal -0.346*** -0.351***
(0.089) (0.080)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal -0.003 0.057
(0.033) (0.037)
contract ∗ unitary -0.090 -0.095
(0.056) (0.070)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.073 -0.233**
(0.086) (0.098)
Controls
def rev -0.217 -0.153 -0.283 0.054 -0.170 -0.121
(0.241) (0.278) (0.264) (0.252) (0.273) (0.223)
def rev(t−1) -0.293 -0.352 -0.321 -0.264 -0.254 -0.340
(0.275) (0.318) (0.320) (0.307) (0.313) (0.275)
unempl -1.005 0.561 1.345 0.542 0.459 -1.387
(1.466) (1.782) (1.803) (1.828) (1.770) (1.441)
unempl(t−1) -0.291 -1.205 -1.895 -0.856 -1.134 -0.168
(1.256) (1.541) (1.603) (1.530) (1.526) (1.268)
tax 0.613* 0.779* 0.877** 0.875** 0.794* 0.642*
(0.329) (0.403) (0.389) (0.386) (0.412) (0.363)
tax(t−1) 1.190*** 1.336*** 1.351*** 1.309*** 1.322*** 1.139***
(0.371) (0.407) (0.389) (0.392) (0.409) (0.383)
depratio 5.510** 6.750** 8.374*** 8.798*** 6.536** 7.166***
(2.422) (2.795) (2.837) (2.913) (2.862) (2.476)
outgap -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
debt gg gdp 0.428*** 0.354** 0.410*** 0.300** 0.299* 0.482***
(0.128) (0.153) (0.148) (0.152) (0.155) (0.141)
ln pop tot 0.273 -0.134 -0.706 0.067 -0.034 -0.055
(0.658) (0.800) (0.850) (0.784) (0.809) (0.702)
edec -0.630* -0.552 -0.678* -0.423 -0.544 -0.642*
(0.360) (0.363) (0.384) (0.386) (0.375) (0.372)
sgp 0.054 0.061* 0.081** 0.053 0.057 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
trend 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.702 0.636 0.647 0.654 0.642 0.735
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Specification according to model (d) in Table 5. Fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 6: Determinants of fiscal rules II
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Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195 0.365* 0.365** 0.334**
(0.120) (0.190) (0.148) (0.141)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.289***
(0.056) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.088** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.014) (0.041) (0.026) (0.024)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001
(0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
country/year FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Excluded Instruments none herfgovt ∗ federal herfgovt
districtt ∗ federal districtt
contractt ∗ federal contractt
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary herfgov(t−1)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary district(t−1)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary contract(t−1)
R2 0.173 0.134 0.134 0.147
Hansen J . 3.799 6.083 12.64
Hansen J p-value . 0.434 0.193 0.245
K-P Weak Id. F . 29.97 10.70 10.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. First stage regressions are presented in Table 12 of Appendix
B. Set of control variables as before, results not reported here but in Table 11 of Appendix B. Model (a):
repetition of the estimation without instrumenting the rules index; Model (b): cluster-robust standard
errors, using the Herfindahl index, the form of fiscal governance and the district magnitude as instruments
for federal countries. For unitary countries the one time lag of these variables is included; Model (c): same
as (b) but with with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model
(d): present and lagged values are used as intsruments in both first stage equations, standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 7: IV regressions
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Figure 5: Policy implications
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Figure 6: Marginal effects interaction terms
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A. Additional tables
Deficit (1) (2) (3)
as share of revenues (1) 1.000
in Euro per capita (2) 0.887 1.000
as share of GDP (3) 0.900 0.955 1.000
Notes: Correlation between different indicators of sub-national deficits.
Table 9: Correlation of deficit measures
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B. Additional regression results
B.1. Results interaction model
Dependent Variable Interaction Terms
Deficit/Revenues
Unitary countries
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.380**
(0.156)
rules ∗ unitary -0.107**
(0.039)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.040
(0.075)
Federal countries
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.087
(0.092)
rules ∗ federal 0.006
(0.021)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.172**
(0.075)
Controls
def cg rev 0.074*
(0.042)
edec 0.181*
(0.087)
intexp rev 0.002
(0.008)
outgap -0.000
(0.002)
unempl -0.148
(0.146)
ln pop tot 0.607***
(0.172)
depratio -0.511*
(0.294)
trend -0.001
(0.001)
country/year FE Yes/Yes
R2 0.289
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Results for a regression allwong for interactions between rules and tax(t−1). Marginal effects pre-
sented in pictures 6 (a) and (b).
Table 10: Results interaction model
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B.2. Details to Table 7
Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076* 0.076* 0.076** 0.077**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)
edec 0.214*** 0.197** 0.197** 0.201**
(0.074) (0.085) (0.088) (0.088)
intexp rev -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.097 -0.097 -0.092
(0.187) (0.215) (0.215) (0.214)
trend 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.542***
(0.136) (0.160) (0.168) (0.167)
depratio -0.603* -0.429 -0.429 -0.481
(0.356) (0.404) (0.377) (0.359)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. Table shows the results for control variables included in the
estimations but not presented in the text in table 7. First stage regressions are presented below. Model
(a): repetition of the estimation without instrumenting the rules index; Model (b): cluster-robust standard
errors, using the Herfindahl index, the form of fiscal governance and the district magnitude as instruments
for federal countries. For unitary countries the one time lag of these varibales is included; Model (c): same
as (b) but with with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model
(d): present and lagged values are used as intruments in both first stage equations, standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 11: Results of controls according to Table 7
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Model (b) Model (c) Model (d)
Equation: rules∗ unitary federal unitary federal unitary federal
Excluded instruments
herfgov ∗ federal -0.187* 0.221*** -0.187* 0.221*** -0.168 0.067
(0.098) (0.058) (0.108) (0.073) (0.116) (0.063)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal -0.022 0.255***
(0.098) (0.082)
contract ∗ federal 0.119** -0.502*** 0.119*** -0.502*** 0.033 -0.447***
(0.061) (0.025) (0.046) (0.093) (0.037) (0.085)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal 0.114*** -0.053***
(0.038) (0.018)
district ∗ federal -0.000 0.007* -0.000 0.007** -0.008 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.010* -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
contract ∗ unitary -0.061 0.019
(0.071) (0.022)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.265** 0.032 -0.265*** 0.032 -0.216** 0.026
(0.126) (0.025) (0.103) (0.020) (0.107) (0.018)
district ∗ unitary 0.008* 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.022*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.001 0.016*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.256 0.044
(0.175) (0.046)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.771*** 0.005 -0.771*** 0.005 -0.557** -0.026
(0.258) (0.025) (0.177) (0.024) (0.224) (0.039)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.083** 0.017 2.083*** 0.017 2.117*** -0.026
(0.822) (0.078) (0.668) (0.096) (0.610) (0.108)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.604* 1.839*** -0.604** 1.839*** -0.538** 1.840***
(0.338) (0.326) (0.246) (0.189) (0.243) (0.174)
def cg rev -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.093 0.016
(0.222) (0.033) (0.162) (0.044) (0.160) (0.046)
edec -0.594** 0.158 -0.594* 0.158 -0.686* 0.121
(0.260) (0.177) (0.345) (0.129) (0.354) (0.121)
intexp rev 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.011
(0.055) (0.016) (0.038) (0.014) (0.040) (0.014)
outgap 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
unempl -0.860 0.087 -0.860 0.087 -0.538 -0.147
(1.644) (0.399) (1.171) (0.274) (1.140) (0.252)
ln pop tot 0.421 0.313 0.421 0.313 0.277 0.196
(0.909) (0.459) (0.625) (0.324) (0.630) (0.312)
depratio 4.733* 0.180 4.733** 0.180 4.897** 0.388
(2.664) (0.747) (2.285) (0.546) (2.380) (0.653)
trend -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.016) (0.005) (0.028) (0.007) (0.028) (0.009)
R-squared 0.588 0.748 0.588 0.748 0.608 0.763
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 7. Endogenous variables in the second stage
is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 12: First stage regressions to Table 7
48
B.3. Details to Table 8
Dep. Var. IV 2SLS Panel Model
Def./Rev. (a.I) federal (a.II) unitary (b.I) federal (b.II) unitary (c.I) federal (c.II) unitary
Controls
def cg rev 0.162*** 0.028 0.159*** 0.029 0.155*** 0.028
(0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.051)
edec 0.376* 0.021 0.378* 0.028 0.381* 0.020
(0.227) (0.101) (0.226) (0.102) (0.223) (0.102)
intexp rev -0.011 0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.009 0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
outgap 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
unempl 1.262*** -0.318 1.287*** -0.309 1.347*** -0.319
(0.290) (0.238) (0.294) (0.238) (0.322) (0.238)
ln pop tot 1.113*** 0.238 1.115*** 0.240 1.119*** 0.237
(0.172) (0.239) (0.172) (0.237) (0.172) (0.239)
depratio 0.884 -0.638* 0.992 -0.658* 1.258 -0.634*
(0.823) (0.351) (0.811) (0.341) (1.053) (0.355)
trend 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=104/143 N=8/11 (federal/unitary) T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. Table shows the results for control variables included in the
estimations but not presented in the text in table 8. First stage regressions are presented below. Separate
regressions for federal (a)/(c)/(e) and unitary (b)/(d)/(f) countries. Model (a)/(b): Actual and lagged
instruments; Model (c)/(d): only actual instruments; model (e)/(f): only lagged instruments. Standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 13: Results of controls according to Table 8
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Equation: rules Model (a.I) Model (a.II) Model (b.I) Model (b.II) Model (c.I) Model (c.II)
Excluded instruments
herfgov 0.079 -0.260 0.168 -0.649***
(0.096) (0.170) (0.105) (0.148)
herfgov(t−1) 0.279** -0.619*** 0.242* -0.828***
(0.118) (0.229) (0.132) (0.184)
contract -0.450*** -0.067 -0.488*** -0.189**
(0.088) (0.082) (0.109) (0.091)
contract(t−1) -0.077* -0.196** -0.372*** -0.251***
(0.039) (0.097) (0.107) (0.094)
district 0.020* 0.004 0.010 0.015***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
district(t−1) -0.009 0.015*** 0.011 0.018***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.101*** 2.749*** 2.048***
(0.540) (0.450) (0.584)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal 1.448*** 1.445*** 1.553***
(0.302) (0.326) (0.415)
def cg rev 0.006 -0.242 -0.135 -0.190 0.043 -0.255
(0.139) (0.236) (0.154) (0.227) (0.224) (0.242)
edec 1.434* -0.812** 1.278 -0.911** 1.267 -0.787*
(0.831) (0.408) (0.852) (0.433) (1.058) (0.408)
intexp rev 0.057* -0.018 0.062* 0.022 0.086* -0.014
(0.030) (0.056) (0.034) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053)
outgap 0.016 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.047** 0.000
(0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008)
unempl 0.585 -1.686 2.276 -1.104 2.775 -1.864
(1.380) (1.723) (1.545) (1.457) (1.898) (1.704)
ln pop tot 1.023 0.835 1.968*** 0.257 1.490* 0.898
(0.664) (1.201) (0.706) (1.137) (0.887) (1.173)
depratio -1.038 3.185 -0.024 3.492 4.702 3.073
(4.082) (2.697) (3.286) (2.705) (5.066) (2.528)
trend 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.002
(0.020) (0.047) (0.017) (0.044) (0.028) (0.048)
R-squared 0.846 0.729 0.831 0.686 0.772 0.722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 8. Endogenous variables in the second stage
is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 14: First stage regressions to Table 8
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C. Construction of the rules index
The construction of the rules index follows the European Commission (2009). I adopt their
dataset and calculate the rules index for the sub-national sectors. All balanced budget rules
and debt rules applying to the sub-national sector are taken into account. All information
about the included rules are available on the webpage of the European Commission. Rules
applying to the general government sector are weighted by the respective sub-national
expenditure share in it. The indicator is the sum of each criterion, devided by the total
number of criteria. Each criteria itself is devided by the maximum score, i.e. all variables
are forced to be between zero and one.
• Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two elements
below:
• Criterion 1a: Statutory or legal base of the rule
4 is assigned for a constitutional base
3 if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility
Law)
2 if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by different
general government tiers (and not enshrined in a legal act)
1 for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government,
Minister of Finance)
• Criterion 1b: Room for setting or revising objectives
3 if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the docu-
ment underpinning the rule)
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule
merely contains broad principles or the obligation for the government or the
relevant authority to set targets)
• Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by one point in case there is a real time
monitoring of compliance with the rule (e.g. existence of alert mechanisms in case
there is a risk of non-respect of the rule).
3 if there is a monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court of
Auditors or any other Court) or the national Parliament
2 monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
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1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assess-
ing compliance)
• Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule
3 enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court) or the
National Parliament
2 enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no specific body in charge of enforcement
• Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen
and clearly specified.
4 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-
compliance
3 there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the
possibility of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of non-
compliance or is obliged to present corrective proposals to Parliament or the
relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance
• Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-
compliance is likely to trigger a public debate
2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to
invoke a public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
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D. Robustness check: federal specification
Throughout the text I used two different data points for each federal country, i.e. I included
the local and regional level as separate observations. Table 15 shows the results of two
robustness checks in order to proof whether results remain unchanged when the data is
treated differently.
Model (a) repeats the previous results of model (d) in table 4 for comparison. The next
column shows a regression where I merged the local and regional government in the four
federal countries. Instead of 19 observations per year the dataset now consists out of 15, one
for each included country. However, results remain unchanged and the main conclusions are
as before.
As a last check, I estimate different coefficients for the local and regional level in federa-
tions. That means that Φ now becomes the following:
Φ′ =

Φ1
Φ2
Φ3
 and
= 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local level in a federal country, else 0
= 1 if regional level in a federal country, else 0
However, results are in line with the previous findings. The signs and magnitude of coeffi-
cients for tax(t−1) are similar for the local and regional level. Rules remain insignificant in
both cases.
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (1) (2) (3)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.186* 0.194**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.309*
(0.069) (0.180)
tax(t−1) ∗ regional -0.300***
(0.076)
tax(t−1) ∗ local -0.332*
(0.174)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.044***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.029
(0.014) (0.023)
rules ∗ regional 0.016
(0.017)
rules ∗ local -0.019
(0.017)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076** 0.120*** 0.074**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
edec 0.214** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.087) (0.114) (0.090)
intexp rev -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.215 -0.059
(0.209) (0.242) (0.210)
trend 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.526** 0.514***
(0.167) (0.223) (0.168)
depratio -0.603* -0.668* -0.615*
(0.331) (0.392) (0.340)
R2 0.270 0.289 0.177
Number of Groups 19 15 19
Number of Observations 247 195 247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Model (a): repetition of the estimation of model (d) in table 4 for comparison; Model (b): the
local and regional level in federal countries are merged; Model (c): individual coefficients for the regional
and local level in federal countries. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey-West).
Table 15: Separate coefficients for local and regional governments
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